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Abstract Although analogical reasoning has long been a popular method of rea-
soning in bioethics, current literature does not sufficiently grasp its variety. We
assert that the main shortcoming is the fact that an analogy’s value is often judged
on the extent of similarity between the source situation and the target situation,
while in (bio)ethics, analogies are often used because of certain dissimilarities rather
than in spite of them. We make a clear distinction between dissimilarities that aim to
reinforce a similar approach in the source situation and the target situation and
dissimilarities that aim to undermine or denounce a similar approach. The former
kind of dissimilarity offers the analogy more normative force than if there were no
dissimilarities present; this is often overlooked by authors who regard all relevant
dissimilarities as detrimental to the analogy’s strength. Another observation is that
an evaluation of the normative force of an analogy cannot be made independently of
moral principles or theories. Without these, one cannot select which elements in an
analogy are morally relevant nor determine how they should be interpreted.
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Introduction
Analogical reasoning is a popular tool in ethical discussions for reaching a better
conceptualization of new situations and obtaining guidance about the right way to
deal with new developments [1]. Analogies can enter the scene either before or after
a moral opinion is formed. Someone may have no immediate (intuitive) moral
opinion on a certain matter and seek guidance through analogous situations that are
less bewildering. Alternatively, one may have an intuitive moral opinion about a
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situation and look for analogies that confirm this opinion, either to reinforce one’s
own opinion or to persuade others to adopt a similar stance. Given the prominent
position of analogies in bioethical debates and their persuasive power as rhetorical
tools, it is important to gain insight into how they function. Although many authors
have written about analogical reasoning, few attempt to grasp the particularities of
analogical reasoning in ethical debates; this has led to a general misinterpretation or
disregard for the force of dissimilarities in analogical reasoning [2–5].1 We aim to
provide a better framework for evaluating analogies in ethical reasoning. This
framework will be illustrated with analogies that are used in the debate on payment
for providers of oocytes for stem cell research. Comparisons have been made with
oocyte donation for infertility treatment [7, 8], sperm donation [9, 10], live kidney
donation [11–13], research subjects [14, 15], employment [14, 16], blood donation
[17, p. 20], bone marrow donation [13, p. 629], jury duty [18], and even trafficking
for prostitution [19]. We limit ourselves to the first five analogies as they are most
prominent (see Table 1).
Moral reasoning by analogy: Balancing casuistry and reliance
on bioethical principles
The use of analogies in moral reasoning is mostly framed within casuistry as a
method, in contrast to inductive or deductive reasoning, of handling ethical issues
on a case by case basis without referring to established bioethical principles or
moral theories. However, analogical reasoning can also be regarded as a method that
is complementary to a reliance on ethical theories or principles instead of one that is
an alternative to them [20–23]. We agree with John Arras that ‘‘the casuists’ account
of case analysis fails to supply us with principles of relevance that explain what
binds the cases together and how the meaning of one case points beyond itself
toward the resolution of subsequent cases’’ [23, p. 40]. But at the same time, moral
reasoning based exclusively on moral theories and principles oftentimes does not
offer a satisfactory answer to specific moral dilemmas. In issues such as paid oocyte
donation for research purposes, multiple commonly accepted principles can be
invoked, but they will not all lead to the same conclusion. Actually, one and the
same principle can often be used to reach a conclusion both for and against
payment. Suppose someone relies on the four central bioethical principles that were
set forward by Beauchamp and Childress: respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence, and justice [24]. If he is arguing for payment, he might say that
accepting payment is consistent with respecting the donor’s autonomous decision to
sell her oocytes, time, and effort (respect for autonomy); that an increased number
of donors (due to the offer of payment) will enable valuable research into
debilitating diseases (beneficence); and that the donor will be fairly compensated for
her donation (justice). If the same person is arguing against payment, he might say
that rejecting payment promotes informed consent free of outside pressure (respect
1 Note that although C. Shelley has developed the notion of ‘disanalogies’, they are not based on
dissimilarities [6].
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Table 1 Five analogies most commonly used in the debate on payment for oocyte donation for
stem cell research
Oocyte donation for infertility treatment
1. ‘‘…in the United States, we already allow women to ‘donate’ their eggs for profit. We allow them to
undergo the same procedure and to undertake what is arguably a far more emotional endeavour—
passing their genes to a child they will never know. How can we conclude that providing eggs for
reproduction is less exploitative or dangerous than providing them for research? We can’t’’
[7, p. 1,290].
2. ‘‘Ads for egg donors are already commonplace on many college campuses, where young women are
motivated to undergo egg extraction for much-needed income ($4-7,000 in most cases) as well as for
altruistic reasons. Both of these motivations could influence thousands more young women and
economically disadvantaged women to undergo risky egg extraction procedures solely for research,
and under circumstances where the benefits are far less clear and mostly still hypothetical’’ [8].
Sperm donation
3. ‘‘Sperm donors are generally paid a minimum of $25 as compensation for approximately one hour of
time and any inconvenience and travel involved. Using this scale, we calculated the time involved in
egg donation…. According to our calculations, an egg donor could expect to receive $1,400 for her
time alone, exclusive of any compensation for travel, risk, or inconvenience.… Since it is standard to
compensate men for sperm donation, shouldn’t the policy be equal pay for equal time?’’ [9, p. 737]
4. ‘‘In 2006, the HFEA published a directive stipulating that sperm and egg donors should not receive
payment beyond reimbursement for out of pocket expenses and up to £250 for loss of earnings.…
However, considering the often lengthy process of donating sperm or eggs, and in the case of the
latter the invasive nature of medical procedures, some critics feel that this amount doesn’t adequately
reflect the time commitment and risks involved.… ‘‘Egg donation is considerably more invasive than
sperm donation, so I don’t see why there should be parity. Women have to have hormonal treatment
and procedures to extract the eggs. My feeling would be egg donation would be a more serious
matter’’ [10].
Live kidney donation
5. ‘‘…there should be no purchase and sell [sic] of eggs… commercialization of eggs is a problem…. It
can barely be justified in… live kidney donation. Even that’s problematic, but at least here you have
someone with a terminal illness whose only option is to undergo dialysis…. But even there we will
not pay that person to donate their kidney’’ [11].
6. ‘‘Selling ova is in fact very much more like selling kidneys than like selling sperm, in terms of
potential loss: ova are finite in number, like kidneys and unlike sperm, and ova extraction is a
surgical procedure, like the removal of a kidney and unlike masturbation to produce semen’’ [12,
p. 46].
7. ‘‘Altruistic donation is widely considered ideal in clinical contexts, such as live organ donation,
where the act carries clear therapeutic benefit. However, this paradigm is unsuitable for oocyte
providers in stem-cell research because this scientific field is still in the early stages of basic
research’’ [13, p. 630].
Research subjects
8. ‘‘In biomedical research, another practice with some similarities to oocyte donation, human subjects
exposed to physical and psychological risks are often reimbursed for expenses. Moreover, they may
receive additional payments to compensate for the time and inconvenience associated with study
participation’’ [14, p. S 241].
9. ‘‘If participants in medical trials can provide valid consent to paid participation, in full knowledge
that some unknown risks may materialize, surely women choosing to donate their eggs to medical
science can equally receive compensatory payments and still consent to running the risks inherent in
egg retrieval? If payment does not vitiate consent in the first case, why must it vitiate consent in the
second?’’ [15, p. 31]
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for autonomy); that it will make fewer women go through the burdensome donation
procedure (non-maleficence); and that it will promote distributive justice as the
donors will not consist primarily of economically underprivileged women (justice).
As a simple referral to these principles does not settle the debate, we need an
alternative approach that allows the particular circumstances of a case to be
evaluated in order to make the underlying abstract principles and theories more
tangible and to determine which principle takes precedence over the others in a
particular case. Reasoning by analogy is a way of doing just that. As previously
discussed by Cas Sunstein, analogical reasoning can be considered to be a relatively
easy method of working back and forth between particular cases and both low- and
high-level principles in order to obtain (a limited version of) reflective equilibrium
[21]. This also implies that analogical reasoning has no specific ‘‘theoretical
allegiances’’: ‘‘The ultimate view of the case and its appropriate resolution comes,
not from a single principle, nor from a dominant theory, but from the converging
impression made by all of the relevant facts and arguments that appear in each of
those spaces’’ [22, p. 245].
The force of similarities versus the force of dissimilarities
When two particular cases are compared, there are always both similarities and
dissimilarities. The easiest way to defend any normative judgment from such a
comparison arises when similarities abound and dissimilarities are few. It is
therefore unsurprising that most of the current literature on analogical reasoning in
ethics deals with such analogies. Dan Hunter defines an analogy as ‘‘a non-identical
or non-literal similarity comparison between two things, which has a predictive or
explanatory effect’’ [25, p. 1,206]. Paul Thagard and Keith Holyoak evaluate
analogies by analyzing their structural consistency and semantic similarity, whereby
the strongest analogies are those with the highest degree of consistency and
similarity between source and target [4]. Based on the structure of analogies in
ethical reasoning as specified by Lynn Gillam [26], analogies with payment for
oocyte donation for research purposes should—ideally—have the following format:
(1) Payment is morally (un)acceptable in situation A.
(2) Oocyte donation for research purposes is the same as situation A in all morally
relevant respects.
(3) Payment for oocyte donation for research purposes is morally (un)acceptable.
Table 1 continued
Employment
10. ‘‘Does the offer of a financial incentive constitute exploitation of [would-be oocyte donors] or their
bodies? This scenario… seems no more exploitative than almost all forms of wage labor’’ [16,
p. 295].
11. ‘‘Payment based on [a reasonable assessment of the time, inconvenience, and discomfort associated
with oocyte retrieval] is also consistent with employment and other situations in which individuals
are compensated for activities demanding time and physical effort’’ [14, p. S241].
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The first premise embodies the requirement that the issue one is trying to solve in
the target situation of the analogy is already solved in the source situation. Pointing
out the similarities between two situations that are equally undecided might be
interesting from an epistemic point of view but not from a normative one. In the
terminology of Thagard and Holyoak’s multiconstraint theory, such an analogy
would have a very low pragmatic effectiveness. The second premise is a trickier
one, as an answer to the question of which particular elements of the source and
target situations are morally relevant (or not) is in itself part of the debate.
Individual opinions will differ depending on the importance that one ascribes to the
different maxims that these elements refer to (see section below, ‘‘The selection of
morally relevant elements’’). The ‘‘perfect classic analogy’’ contains elements that
pertain to all moral principles that different moral actors consider important, and all
these elements are similar in source and target.
In practice, analogies are seldom as clear-cut as this abstract structure suggests.
There are always dissimilarities between source and target, and rather than being a
disturbing factor in the analogy, we argue that they are often the reason why a
particular analogy is chosen. For example, analogy 1 (in Table 1) explicitly points
to the fact that oocyte donation for reproductive purposes is ‘‘a far more emotional
endeavour’’ than oocyte donation for research purposes. The reason for pointing this
out is not to conclude that the analogy is invalid or that the practice of compensating
donors in the former situation cannot be transferred to the latter situation. On the
contrary, it suggests that if financial compensations should be forbidden or
discouraged, it should be when oocytes are donated for reproductive purposes rather
than when they are donated for research purposes. A similar reasoning is found in
analogy 9, which argues that if payments do not vitiate research participants’
consent to unknown risks, surely it does not threaten oocyte providers’ consent to
known risks. In order words, if financial compensation should be forbidden in either
case, it should be in the former (where it is not) and not in the latter. These analogies
are not brought forward in spite of dissimilarities but because of the dissimilarities.
This particular use of analogies has been unidentified, let alone systematically
presented, in the ethics literature on analogical reasoning. This may be due to the
fact that most theories regarding analogical reasoning have their roots in legal
reasoning, in which the rule of precedent (and thus similarity between different
situations) is of utmost importance. We aim to fill this gap by suggesting a new
framework for the evaluation of analogical reasoning in ethics that recognizes the
value and rhetorical purpose of the dissimilarities between source and target.
A proposed framework for analogical reasoning in ethics
Three categories
At least three different categories of analogies should be discerned in ethical
reasoning:
(1) Similar analogy: the analogy focuses on the similarities between source and
target, aiming at a corresponding moral judgment in the source and target situation.
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This is the standard and most straightforward kind of analogy. Dissimilarities
between source and target may be present, but they are not morally relevant.
(2) Dissimilar undermining analogy: the analogy focuses on the dissimilarity
between source and target, rejecting a similar moral judgment. We label these
dissimilarities ‘‘undermining’’ as they undermine the transfer of a moral judgment
from source to target. However, they are in themselves incapable of indicating
which alternative moral judgment should be made in the target situation. These
kinds of analogies are thus different from the other two in the sense that they are
destructive rather than constructive. They merely indicate that the target is less
morally acceptable (or unacceptable) than the acceptable (or unacceptable) source,
but whether the target is morally unacceptable (or acceptable) remains undeter-
mined. When two situations are similar in all morally relevant aspects,
consistency requires that a similar moral judgment be made. However, the
opposite is not true. When two situations are dissimilar, consistency does not
require that a different moral judgment be made. For example, it makes no sense
to say that because murder and fraud are dissimilar and murder is morally
unacceptable, fraud must therefore be morally acceptable. Fraud is morally
unacceptable not because it resembles murder but, rather, because it resembles
theft, deception, or lying. However, although dissimilar undermining analogies do
not lead to a clear moral judgment, they are not useless as they have a strong
rhetorical power to invalidate a classic analogy made by an opponent in an ethical
discussion.
(3) Dissimilar reinforcing analogy: the analogy focuses on the dissimilarity
between source and target but nevertheless aims at a similar moral judgment in
source and target, as the dissimilarity indicates that the moral judgment made in
the source situation is even more appropriate in the target situation. We consider
these dissimilarities to be reinforcing as they make the transfer of a moral
judgment from source to target even more plausible than in the case of
similarity. It is this category of dissimilar reinforcing analogies that is of special
interest to us as we believe it has been widely overlooked. One often takes for
granted that similarities render an analogy stronger and dissimilarities render it
weaker, which is indeed the case from an epistemic point of view. From a
normative point of view, however, this second type of dissimilar analogy
actually has the opposite effect and supports a certain stance more strongly than
a classic analogy.
A further division can be made depending on the moral judgment of the source
situation, which can be either morally acceptable or morally unacceptable. A simple
way to frame the three kinds of analogies is, then, that in similar analogies the target
situation is equally morally acceptable or unacceptable as the source situation; in
dissimilar undermining analogies the target situation is less morally acceptable or
unacceptable than the source situation; and in dissimilar reinforcing analogies the
target situation is more morally acceptable or unacceptable than the source situation.
Schematically, we can visualize the different types of analogical reasoning as
follows:
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Very 
acceptable
Morally 
acceptable
Undecided
Morally 
unacceptable
Very 
unacceptableLess morally 
acceptable
Less morally 
unacceptable
Similar 
analogy
source 1
target 1
source 2
target 2
Dissimilar 
undermining
analogy
source 1 target 1 target 2 source 2
Dissimilar 
reinforcing 
analogy
target 1 source 1 source 2 target 2
As illustrated in this scheme, the most effective analogies are the dissimilar
reinforcing analogies as they clearly pull the target situation to either pole of the
continuum between morally acceptable and morally unacceptable situations, thus
defending a stronger conclusion. The least effective ones are dissimilar undermining
analogies as they pull the target situation to the middle, leaving it undecided.
Applying the categories
Applying the three categories of analogies to the discussion regarding financial
incentives for oocyte donation for research purposes, we can classify the analogies
found in the literature as follows (see Table 1):
– Similar analogies: payment is morally acceptable in both source and target
situations—analogies 3, 8, 10, and 11.
– Similar analogies: payment is morally unacceptable in both source and target
situations—analogy 6.
– Dissimilar undermining analogies: payment is less morally acceptable in the
target situation than in the source (where it is considered acceptable)—analogy
2.
– Dissimilar undermining analogies: payment is less morally unacceptable in the
target situation than in the source (where it is considered unacceptable)—
analogy 7.
– Dissimilar reinforcing analogies: payment is even more morally acceptable in
the target situation than in the source (where it is already considered
acceptable)—analogies 1, 4, and 9.
– Dissimilar reinforcing analogies: payment is even more morally unacceptable
in the target situation than in the source (where it is already considered
unacceptable)—analogy 5.
It is important to note that analogies sharing the same source and target situation
do not necessarily fall within the same category or lead to the same moral judgment.
For example, although analogies 5 through 7 all use kidney donation as the source
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situation and oocyte donation for research purposes as the target situation, analogy 5
is a dissimilar reinforcing analogy, analogy 6 is a classic analogy, and analogy 7 is a
dissimilar undermining analogy. Also, analogies 1 and 2 both refer to the payment
of oocyte donors for infertility treatment as an accepted practice, but while analogy
1 is aimed at defending payment for research donors, analogy 2 is aimed at rejecting
payment. These divergences are illustrations of the fact that oftentimes partial
analogies are made that only map a limited number of elements from source to
target situation, depending on which elements one judges morally relevant, and of
the fact that even analogies that incorporate the same elements can lead to a
different moral judgment if they are interpreted through the lens of a different
maxim or principle.
The selection of morally relevant elements and the selection of moral principles
for their interpretation are also the two grounds on which analogies can be rebutted.
First, the fact that most analogies are partial rather than exhaustive makes it possible
to argue that the wrong set of elements has been isolated because not all the morally
relevant elements were taken into consideration and/or because the included
elements were not morally relevant. Second, one could counter an analogy by
questioning the interpretation of the selected elements rather than questioning their
moral relevance as such.
The selection of morally relevant elements
The fact that almost all analogies in ethical debates are partial analogies implies that
a selection of relevant elements takes place. It is therefore difficult, if not
impossible, to evaluate analogies without referring to the moral principles or
theories that justify particular selections.2
To clarify the way in which individual elements and underlying principles are
intertwined, we provide an overview of the elements and maxims that are deemed
relevant by the different authors in our example analogies. In the debate regarding
paid oocyte donation for research purposes, the main areas of concern are
commodification of human (reproductive) body tissue, undue inducement (jeopar-
dizing informed consent), and exploitation [27]. Elements that are of utmost
importance for the first argument are the exchange of body tissue and money.
Analogies 5 and 6 clearly appeal to the commodification argument, using words
such as ‘‘purchase,’’ ‘‘commercialization,’’ and ‘‘selling.’’ The argument of undue
inducement relies on the idea that the risks associated with oocyte donation are so
high that no rational person would assume them merely to further research.
Analogies 1, 2, 6, and 9 use words such as ‘‘dangerous,’’ ‘‘risky,’’ ‘‘surgical
procedure,’’ ‘‘consent,’’ and ‘‘risks,’’ either to support or deny the claim of undue
inducement. The final major argument against payment is that payment will lead to
exploitation of economically disadvantaged women. Words referring to the
argument of exploitation are ‘‘risks,’’ ‘‘economically disadvantaged women,’’
2 The most noteworthy attempt to determine which elements and relations are more likely to be relevant
or irrelevant from a ‘‘neutral’’ perspective is that by Gentner, which basically rests on the idea that the
more intertwined elements (or object-attributes) and relationships are, the more likely it is that they are
also relevant [2].
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‘‘exploitative,’’ ‘‘dangerous,’’ and ‘‘exploitation’’ in analogies 1, 2, and 10. The
main argument for payment is the argument from fairness. Analogies referring to
this argument will focus on the ‘‘input’’ of the donor as these are the elements that
will need to be offset by payment if it is to constitute a fair transaction. Analogies 3,
4, 8, and 11 mention ‘‘time commitment,’’ ‘‘inconvenience,’’ ‘‘travel,’’ ‘‘risk,’’
‘‘expenses,’’ ‘‘loss of earnings,’’ ‘‘discomfort,’’ and ‘‘physical effort.’’ A final
argument—which is used to argue both for and against payment—is of a utilitarian
nature, weighing the benefits and disadvantages that would follow if payment would
be allowed. This kind of argumentation is found in analogies 2 and 5, which
mention both the disadvantages for the donor and the benefits to society
(highlighting either their presence or absence); this argument mentions ‘‘risky egg
extraction procedure,’’ ‘‘solely for research,’’ ‘‘benefits are far less clear and mostly
still hypothetical,’’ and ‘‘at least here you have someone with a terminal illness.’’3
All of these elements are thus possibly morally relevant, although not everyone
may agree on the importance of the mentioned arguments and the maxims or
principles they rely on. It has, for example, been convincingly argued that the
commodification of body tissue is not per se morally wrong [28, p. 261]. Depending
on which moral principles or theories a person adheres to, different elements may
thus be considered morally (ir)relevant. As mentioned, few analogies are all
encompassing. Seven analogies (analogies 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11) have filtered out
elements that refer to only one argument, three analogies (analogies 1, 5, and 6)
refer to two arguments, and only one (analogy 2) refers to three arguments. If we
look at the organ donation analogies more closely, analogies 5 and 6 primarily
contain elements that refer to commodification, starting from the implicit idea that a
ban on payment to kidney donors is based on the fact that body tissue should not be
treated as a commodity. Analogy 7, on the contrary, refers to the contrast between
the clear therapeutic benefit for kidney patients in comparison to the more debatable
benefits of stem cell research. The fact that the goal of the donation is filtered out
indicates that the speaker does not support the idea that payment for kidney donors
is wrong because of the commodification argument (for which the goal is irrelevant)
but because we have a moral duty to help people in need rather than profiting from
their precarious situation, which is not transferrable to the target situation. In this
case, a selection of different elements represents an adherence to different maxims
and leads to a different conclusion.
The dual role of ethical principles in dissimilar analogies
Apart from their role in determining which elements are relevant for a given moral
actor, maxims and moral principles have an additional role when dissimilar
analogies are concerned. Not the particular morally relevant elements as such but,
rather, the moral principles by which they are evaluated determine the ‘‘direction’’
in which a dissimilarity between relevant elements pulls the target of an analogy:
3 Analogy 7 is not mentioned as it does not refer to any of the five principle arguments for and against
payment for oocyte providers. Instead, it refers to the argument of altruism (as opposed to exploitation of
a patient) in the debate regarding the payment of organ providers, which is not morally relevant here (as
the analogy intends to show).
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either to the poles or to the center of the continuum between morally acceptable and
morally unacceptable situations.
If two people select the same elements as morally relevant while relying on
different moral principles and make similar analogies, this will not lead to a conflict,
and in this sense, similar analogies increase the possibility of reaching consensus on
a specific case without necessarily agreeing on the underlying moral principles [21,
p. 782]. For example, person A is convinced that fairness requires that oocyte
providers receive a compensation that offsets their input, while person B is
convinced that respect for the donor’s autonomy requires that payments should be
limited in order not to jeopardize informed consent. Both A and B live in Spain,
where oocyte donors for IVF treatment are routinely paid €900. Making a similar
analogy, we could state that as an oocyte donor for IVF treatment undergoes the
same ovarian stimulation and oocyte pick-up procedures as an oocyte provider for
stem cell research, they should be equally compensated. This analogy could
convince both A and B to agree with us, albeit for different reasons: person A would
agree because if €900 is a fair compensation in the source situation, it is also a fair
compensation in the target situation, and person B would agree because if €900 does
not jeopardize informed consent in the source, it does not jeopardize informed
consent in the target either.
However, in dissimilar analogies, these different moral principles will not lead
to the same moral verdict. Suppose someone presents persons A and B with the
fact that sperm donors are routinely paid €35 but that sperm donation is a lot less
invasive and does not entail any physical discomfort or risks as opposed to oocyte
donation. Person A will consider this to be a reinforcing analogy: if sperm donors
are entitled to a compensation for a minor effort, surely oocyte providers should be
compensated for a much greater effort. Person B, however, will consider this to be
an undermining dissimilar analogy: both the amount that a sperm donor receives
and the risks involved are so minor, that in this case, it is very unlikely that the
payment will lead the donor to donate against his better judgment. However, as the
risks are greater in the case of oocyte donation, payment is less morally
acceptable.
Final remark about the choice of analogies in moral reasoning
A final note needs to be made on the choice of analogies in bioethical debates.
Whether a certain analogy is popular does not depend only on whether it
incorporates the ‘‘right’’ elements or interprets them according to the ‘‘right’’ moral
principles. Without claiming to be exhaustive, we name at least two other factors
that are at play. First, analogies may be endorsed based on ‘‘surface level
similarities’’ between source and target, regardless of whether these superficial
similarities are morally relevant [25]. In our case example, this factor will, for
example, favor the analogy with oocyte donation for infertility treatment. As the
two main elements of the target situation—oocytes and donation—are also present
in the source situation, people are more likely to accept this analogy or even the
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sperm donation analogy than the research subject analogy. However, the superficial
observation that reproductive tissue is involved sparks a myriad of sensitivities that
are relevant in the evaluation of payment to donors for IVF (as the tissue will be
used for reproductive purposes) but that are largely irrelevant in the context of stem
cell research (as the tissue will not be used for reproductive purposes), which is
easily ignored.
Second, it is always easier to accept an analogy when it is consistent with
acquired beliefs and leads to a desired outcome. In our example of payment to
oocyte providers for stem cell research, a particular analogy may be chosen to
pursue a goal that goes beyond the issue of payment, namely, to plead for or against
human embryonic stem cell research. People who are opposed to such research in
general will opt for analogies that plead against payment since support for payment
of oocyte providers is indirectly linked to support for research while opposition to
payment is a way of hampering it. The opposite is undoubtedly equally true.
Researchers who are experiencing difficulties recruiting oocyte donors without
offering monetary incentives will be more inclined to present their research as
similar to other practices in which payment is allowed than to practices that do not
allow payment as it serves their goal of gaining approval to offer money to donors.
Especially when different generally accepted moral principles are at play that seem
to lead to different conclusions about the issue at hand (as is the case here), one may
be tempted to pick out those principles—and those analogies—that are most
‘‘convenient.’’
Conclusion
Although analogical reasoning has long been a popular method in bioethics, existing
literature does not sufficiently grasp the variety of analogical ethical reasoning. We
assert that the main shortcoming is the fact that an analogy’s value is often judged
on the extent of similarity between the source situation and the target situation,
while in (bio)ethics, analogies are often used because of certain dissimilarities rather
than in spite of them. We have made a clear distinction between dissimilarities that
aim to reinforce a similar approach in the source situation and the target situation
and dissimilarities that aim to undermine or denounce a similar approach. The
former kind of dissimilarity offers the analogy more normative force than if the
dissimilarity were not present; this is often overlooked by authors who regard all
relevant dissimilarities as detrimental to the analogy’s strength. Another observation
is that an evaluation of the normative force of an analogy cannot be made
independently of moral principles or theories. Without these, one can neither select
which elements in an analogy are morally relevant nor determine how they should
be interpreted.
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